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1 Ebola  is  an extreme  example  of  the
collective  failure  to  identify,  respond  to
and control an epidemic. Lessons ‘learned’
from  the  Ebola  response  are  not  new.
Evaluations  of  responses  to  previous
epidemics  have  already  exposed  the
weaknesses  of  current  policies  and
practices,  showing  how  the  world  is
unprepared to effectively address rare or
emerging diseases
2 The  Ebola  outbreak  in  West  Africa  has
been—in  fact—a  wake-up  call,  showing
that we are not ready to respond to large-
scale epidemics, mostly because the foundations for such a response are weak. If local
and national  outbreaks2 of  diseases  such as  malaria,  measles  or  cholera—which are
well-known,  preventable  and  treatable—are  yet  to  be  properly  identified  and
responded  to,  how  can  we  expect  transnational  outbreaks  of  emerging  and  rare
diseases to be addressed properly? 
3 High mortality characterises epidemics.  The risk of dying from malaria is five to ten
times higher during an epidemic than in situations where transmission rates are stable
(Kiszewski and Teklehaimanot, 2004). According to World Health Organization (WHO)
estimates the case fatality rate (CFR) for measles in low-income countries ranges from
0.05 to 6 per cent, but can reach 30 per cent in certain situations, with higher measles
CFRs reached during outbreaks (Wolfson et al., 2009). In Africa alone, an estimated 12.4
million cases of malaria are related to epidemics, which represents 4 per cent of all
total cases of malaria reported worldwide. However, the number of deaths attributable
to malaria epidemics in Africa may be as high as 155,000‒310,000 per year, accounting
for one in four malaria deaths worldwide (Worrall et al., 2004). The number of deaths at
the community level linked to epidemics can be up to ten times higher than that of
deaths reported by health structures, surpassing the emergency threshold (N’Goran et
al., 2013).  
4 But not all epidemics are equal, nor are they addressed in the same way. The national
and international threat posed by a ‘level four’ biosecurity pathogen such as Ebola is
simply not comparable with that posed by measles and other outbreaks of infectious
diseases.  The latter are not seen as a cause for international concern, yet they still
claim hundreds of thousands of lives every year and the majority go unnoticed and
raise little concern outside directly affected populations. 
5 This  article  looks  at  the  following  difficulties  encountered  in  ensuring  a  timely
identification and response to all epidemics—
Insufficient monitoring
The global security approach oversight
Delays in the identification of epidemics: weak surveillance system and alert mechanisms
Delays in declarations of epidemics: a political decision
Failing to respond: (a) tension between prevention and emergency response; (b) practical
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6 From weak surveillance systems and politically centred decisions,  to poor access to
healthcare for the general population and limited response capacity from the health
system, all these elements add to the current situation in which epidemics without the
potential  to  be  points  of  international  concern  are  not  properly  addressed.  This
situation is unacceptable not only for the populations directly affected but also for the
global community, increasing the risk of large-scale/transnational epidemics.
 
1. Epidemic Diseases: The Unquantified Threat
7 Epidemic-prone diseases remain a serious public threat worldwide, and in low-income
countries in particular. Poverty, high population density and poor access to clean water
and sanitation,  coupled with weak vector  control  and limited access  to  healthcare,
contribute  to  the  re-emergence  of  previously  controlled  diseases  such  as  measles,
malaria  and  cholera.  In  2013,  nearly  nine  million  deaths  were  estimated  to  be
attributable to communicable diseases (The Lancet, 2015), the majority of them in low-
income countries and tropical areas. 
8 It  is  not  easy to  know how many outbreaks are ongoing at  a  given moment,  or  to
estimate  the  real  scale  of  the  problem.  While  there  are  several  public  sources  of
information,  there  is  no  one  validated  and  real-time  global  database  available  to
consult.  The  WHO’s  Global  Alert  and  Response  (GAR)—which  monitors  outbreaks,
supports  countries  in  outbreak  investigation  and  reports  events  worldwide—has
limited scope.3  In addition to the difficulties in obtaining real-time information, annual
reports  are  not  exhaustive.  In  2014,  only  three  African  countries  reported  measles
outbreaks (WHO, 2015a), not including South Sudan where MSF and other organisations
responded to measles outbreaks in several camps for internally displaced people, or
Uganda where authorities declared a measles outbreak in the Arua area affecting the
local population and South Sudanese refugees (UNHCR, 2014. Nor did the WHO report
include the largest visceral leishmaniasis4 epidemic in South Sudan since 1999. From
the information available publicly, and from MSF’s field experience, one can conclude
that the majority of small and some medium-sized outbreaks (with or without adequate
response) are most likely not reported, making it difficult to quantify the real extent of
the problem. 
9 Every year scores of outbreaks, both small and large, affect all regions of the world. The
majority do not have pandemic potential and therefore receive little attention from the
media. With several emergencies fighting for attention, it is no surprise that ‘another’
measles outbreak in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or ‘another’ cholera
outbreak in Juba, South Sudan, fails to make headlines or to mobilise the international
community to support the affected population.
 
2. The Security/Trade Perspective: An Unwise and Narrow Approach
10 An  international  framework  exists  to  safeguard  the  timely  identification  of  and
response  to  acute  public  health  risks;  it  is  made  up  of  what  are  known  as  the
International Health Regulations (IHR), which are binding for all member countries of
the World Health Organization (WHO). The purpose and scope are ‘to prevent, protect
against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of
disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and
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which  avoid  unnecessary  interference  with  international  traffic  and  trade’  (WHO,
2006). They require countries to report to the WHO those disease outbreaks and public
health events that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide. 
11 Although the World Health Assembly (WHA) endorsed the IHR in their second iteration
in 2005,5 and they came into force in 2007,  by 2013 only 20 per cent of  the WHO’s
member countries had achieved compliance with the core capacities outlined in the
regulations (WHO, 2013). One of the building blocks of the IHR is to strengthen national
disease prevention,  surveillance,  and control  and response systems.  Some countries
still have a long way to go before a reliable, nationwide alert and response system is in
place. This lack of compliance, together with limited access to healthcare for significant
parts of the population, further increases the probability that outbreaks will continue
to occur without being noticed.
12 The IHR’s success relies on states achieving compliance with these core capacities. This
entails all  acute public health risks being identified at a country level,  even if  only
those that will actually have an impact internationally are reported to the WHO. Failing
to ensure a national response has a domino effect that ultimately causes a global effect.
13 Several initiatives have been launched by high-income countries aiming to support the
implementation of the IHR. These include the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI),
launched in 2001. The Ottawa plan for improving health security, agreed in November
2001,  includes  the  aim ‘to  further  support  the  World  Health  Organization's disease
surveillance network and WHO efforts to develop a coordinated strategy for disease
outbreak containment’ (GHSI, 2001). This implies improving the capacity of states other
than those that are members of the GHSI to respond to national outbreaks. However, 14
years  after  its  creation  and  the  beginning  of  its  support  for  the  WHO  and  IHR
implementation,  the  progress  made  in  achieving  results  that  benefit  people  in
developing countries is questionable.
14 In  the  name  of  global  health  security,  developed  countries  made  commitments  to
create better access to vaccines and rapid diagnostic tests targeting pathogens that
could eventually be used as biological weapons, such as smallpox or flu. However, one
cannot overlook the fact that the primary objective for such commitments was actually
to protect their own citizens. They were focused on protecting their countries from the
‘threat of international biological, chemical and radio-nuclear terrorism’ (GHSI, 2015),
rather than on ensuring that populations in low-income countries would benefit from a
better response to epidemics. 
15 Investment in research and development (R&D) of new vaccines or rapid diagnostic
tests for neglected diseases is still painfully absent. Diseases low on the security agenda
are not prioritised, while current R&D policies are not conducive to bringing to the
market vaccines or treatments for diseases such as Ebola, which—prior to 2014—only
affected a few hundred people in remote areas of Africa. 
16 The West Africa outbreak of 2014, with 27,952 cases and 11,284 deaths (WHO. 2015c),
 has  been a  wake-up call  for  many:  obscure diseases  that  have so far  only affected
isolated and rural populations in Africa can cross international borders. A reluctance to
invest  in  identifying  local  outbreaks  and  in  developing  better  diagnostics  and
treatments for neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) today may lead to a threat to us all
tomorrow. 
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17 Ebola highlighted some of the well-known deficiencies of the national and international
response  to  epidemics.  Responses  to  the  needs  of  those  populations  affected  by
outbreaks—even those outbreaks that apparently do not pose an international threat—
need to be prioritised. As expressed by Joanne Liu, MSF International President, at the
68th World Health Assembly:
18 ‘Emergency response reform is about treating people, not just global health security or
strengthening health systems.  Member states  with the means to  respond to deadly
disease outbreaks in other countries cannot act only in their national self -interests,
closing their borders and hoping it will burn out. They must quickly deploy resources
to  combat  the  disease  at  its  source,  to  save  lives  and  prevent  further  spread.
Communities  infected  with  a  highly  contagious  virus  are  not  biohazards.  They  are
patients with families’ (MSF, 2015).
 
3. Failure to Identify Epidemics: Weak Surveillance Systems and an
Absence of Functional Alert Mechanisms
19 The difficulties of declaring an outbreak can usually be linked to weak surveillance
systems  and  the  absence  of  alert  mechanisms  in  the  affected  countries.  Detecting
transmission in remote areas at  a  community level  is  not an easy task.  Even when
heavy investment and intense surveillance are in place—as is the case for polio—cases
of  undetected  transmission  occurring  during  one  year  or  more  have  been
demonstrated (WHO, 2007). 
20 MSF’s  own experience  has  shown that  even  an  emergency  organisation  can  fail  to
detect outbreaks if not enough attention is paid. This has occurred, for example, in the
DRC’s  Orientale  province,  where  malaria  transmission  remains  intense.  Expected
seasonal variations with cases occurring in hard-to-reach areas make it difficult to have
a proper early warning system. In 2012, for example, a malaria outbreak was detected
by MSF after it had peaked. Despite official data from the Ministry of Health showing
increasing numbers of cases and deaths from malaria, it was the local population that
alerted MSF teams to abnormally high numbers of children with fever dying (Koscalova
and Iscla, 2014). The late identification of an outbreak, especially when followed by a
slow  response,  further  endangers  people’s  lives  and  well-being.  Unfortunately,  the
countries with weaker surveillance systems are usually those where the gap is largest
between preparedness and response plans on paper and how these elements are put
into practice. 
21 Surveillance systems are usually based on health facility information. Transmission can
be ongoing in  the  population for  some time before  the  alert  is  raised.  Despite  the
international  support  given  to  governments  to  help  them  strengthen  their  health
systems, there is still a long way to go. In the majority of the countries where MSF
works, the health system is inaccessible for a significant proportion of the population,
often due to distance, financial barriers or lack of trained health-care staff. As a result,
cases are not reported to the health facilities. 
22 In the majority of cases where epidemics are confined to isolated areas or small pockets
of the population, Ministries of Health can expect little external support. Substantial
support  with  significant  means  (not  only  funding,  but  also  logistics  and  qualified
human resources for hands-on work) from the aid system is generally activated for
emergency response only when the epidemic is large, affects several countries or is
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perceived as out of control. The majority of epidemics will never capture the public’s
attention,  nor  will  they  qualify  as  a  Public  Health  Event  of  International  Concern
(PHEIC), triggering the aid system to intervene in full force. Consequently the response
will be led by the Ministry of Health of the affected country, with responsibility usually
decentralised to the local or regional level, and with the practical implementation of
the response supported by no more than a few actors.
 
4. Delays in Declaring an Epidemic: Politics and Policies
4.1 Politics: The Lack of Incentives to Declare Epidemics 
23 The actual declaration of an epidemic can be politically and economically sensitive,
impacting  on  international  trade  (as  with  cholera  in  rice-exporting  nations)  or  on
sectors such as tourism. There may even be a refusal to acknowledge certain diseases,
for example declaring a cholera outbreak as acute watery diarrhoea.6 This may not pose
a problem if the response is deployed appropriately, but it nevertheless reflects the
sensitivity  of  the topic  and can have negative repercussions with regards to  which
outbreak control measures are put in place.7
24 Ebola  is  a  good  example  of  such  a  combined  effect.  The  potential  economic
repercussions of declaring an Ebola outbreak in a country, together with the risk of
social  unrest and loss of trust in health institutions,  may have played a role in the
refusal of some countries to investigate rumours early or to proactively look for cases
in locations where there was no known active transmission.
25 Regional and international dynamics also play an important role. An extreme example
is the delay in declaring the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa a PHEIC. In March 2014,
two countries—Guinea and Liberia—were reporting confirmed cases and by May 2014,
cases had been confirmed in Sierra Leone. One can argue that the internal politics and
slow decision making of the WHO played a significant role in the process, but within
the IHR there are mechanisms to overcome such a problem giving the Director General
full powers to declare a PHEIC (IHR, 2005, article 12.3)
26 Retrospectively it is interesting to analyse the timing. It was not until cases arrived in
the US or Europe, therefore threatening GHSI member states, that the WHO Director
General declared Ebola a PHEIC on 8 August 2014, eight months after the first cases
were confirmed in Guinea and with confirmed intense transmission ongoing in two
other countries for months. Shortly after, the UN Security Council declared the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa a threat to peace and security, following the first meeting in its
history to address a public health crisis.
27 By  May  2014  three  countries  had  reported  cases  in  the  first  transnational  Ebola
outbreak. That should have triggered a PHEIC declaration at least three months earlier
than was actually the case. 
28 There are no clear incentives for countries to identify and declare epidemics. Already
struggling to respond to the long-term needs of their population, and with the risk of
facing trade limitations or damaging the tourist sector, it should not come as a surprise
that the authorities of affected countries are not eager to declare an epidemic—which
will further stretch their limited capacity and potentially set their economy back—if
there is no reward for doing so. 
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4.2 The Conflict between Prevention and Response to an Epidemic: The Role of
Current Policies
29 Vaccine-preventable diseases are the best example of the conflict between prevention
and response to an epidemic. Since the WHO launched the Expanded Programme on
Immunization (EPI) in 1974, the use of vaccination as a public health intervention has
been considered one of the most cost-effective ways of reducing child morbidity and
mortality.  Global  health  actors  including  donors  and  governments  have  invested
heavily in prevention as the main tool to fight vaccine-preventable diseases.  The global
effort includes internationally-backed initiatives such as Gavi, the vaccine alliance; the
Measles and Rubella Initiative (MRI), the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), the
International  Finance  Facility  for  Immunization  (IFFIm)  or  the  Pneumo  Advance
Market Commitment (AMC). The total expenditure on routine immunisation from 2006
to 2013 was around USD 22 billion (WHO, 2015d). The government-funded contribution
to overall expenditure on routine immunisation is variable by region and individual
country, with 20 countries entirely dependent on international support in 2006 (Lydon
et al., 2008). 
30 Prioritising  prevention  has  produced  some  laudable  achievements  and  has  had  a
substantial impact. There has been an impressive amount of progress made over recent
decades towards better vaccination coverage through the EPI, thereby decreasing the
total number of cases, related deaths and the likelihood of epidemics. However, these
initiatives have only a limited ability to respond to emergencies, and mechanisms for
requesting  funds  for  responses  to  epidemics  beyond  supplementary  immunisation
activities (SIAs), which are usually scheduled and agreed in advance, are cumbersome.
In 2013, for example, the MRI’s total budget was more than USD 240 million, yet only
USD 5 million of this was dedicated to responding to epidemics (MRI, 2014).
31 The  success  of  national  EPIs  is  quantified  using  DPT3  (diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis
vaccine)  coverage.  DPT3  coverage  in  the  first  12  months  of  a  child’s  life  in  Africa
increased from 5 per cent in 1980 to 75 per cent in 2013, but this improvement has
slowed in the past two years (WHO, 2015a). Vaccination coverage by country is patchy,
with  some  countries  better  off  than  others.  Even  within  a  country,  vaccination
coverage may vary between districts, with hard-to-reach populations having the lowest
coverage rates. There are still large unimmunised birth cohorts in low- and middle-
income countries (MICs), and recently even in high-income countries (HICs) due to a
different  problematic:  anti-vaccine  campaigns.  The  competing  priorities  for  health
systems, alongside the existence of sizeable ‘invisible communities’,8 mean vaccination
coverage can be far from optimal, increasing the risk of epidemics. 
32 Official immunisation coverage figures can be up to double those returned by actual
surveys. In 2011 in Chad, the official estimation of DPT3 coverage was 70 per cent, yet a
vaccination  coverage  survey  showed  that  only  42  per  cent  of  children  had  been
vaccinated (UNICEF, 2014).  This may be explained partially by the Chad Ministry of
Health reporting coverage based on obsolete population figures. When the theoretical
coverage is good, there may be little interest in looking beyond the reported figures. In
countries  with weak vaccination coverage,  this  should lead to  intensified efforts  to
improve  the  EPI  and  the  preparedness  and  response  capacity in  case  an  epidemic
breaks out.
Policy Debate | International Responses to Global Epidemics: Ebola and Beyond
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement, 6.2 | 2015
7
33 Epidemics  are  often  viewed  as  some  sort  of  failure  for  governments  and  their
international partners.  The true failure is that decision- and policymakers refrain from
taking ownership and acknowledging the potential shortfalls of national programmes.
A measles outbreak, for example, may imply disappointing results from the EPI due to
suboptimal coverage or low vaccine effectiveness, so its existence is therefore denied.
Poor EPI performance translates into loss of support from donors; Gavi’s performance
payment, for example, is based on improvements in immunisation outcomes, with up
to USD 30 per additional child immunised paid out if DPT3/measles coverage improves
compared with the previous year or the baseline (GAVI, 2014). As they risk losing a
much-needed  cash  injection,  it  is  not  surprising  that  countries  are  not  open  to
declaring outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases that may expose the failures of
their national programmes or raise doubts about the indicators reported. 
34 Currently, the majority of developing countries are facing a double burden of disease.
In  addition to  the  heavy toll  that  infectious  diseases  inflict  on the  population,  the
complications of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and injuries are further straining
their health systems. Limited resources sometimes mean that decisions are made to
reduce emergency capacity so as to safeguard resources for achieving long-term goals.
This may come with a dangerous price: lower capacity for epidemic response. While the
need to invest in long-term goals and prevention is unquestionable, we still need to
ensure that building for the future does not imply accepting collateral damage in the
form  of  victims  of  epidemics  that  go  ignored  today.  Resilient  health  systems  and
communities are the end goal. But epidemics are like fires, and even if progress is being
made on fireproofing a house, it is unwise to leave a room in flames.  
35 Helping states  to  better  respond should not  mean they cede their  responsibility  to
private sector actors or international agencies. The dominant role played by private
sector  actors  in  setting  the  global  health  agenda  is  worrying,  especially  when one
considers that governments are directly or indirectly allowing this privatisation of aid
as  an alternative to  further  investing themselves.  When the WHO and other  global
health actors receive up to 60 per cent of their funds from private donors, it raises the
risk  that  they  will  be  influenced  by  private  agendas,  and  their  resources  will  be
directed towards concrete programmes that do not necessarily help those most at risk. 
 
5. Failing to Respond to Outbreaks: Lack of Capacity and Tools, and
Practical Constrains
5.1 Ill-Equipped and Unwilling
36 Identifying and declaring an outbreak is only the first step on the path to controlling it.
Adapting the response to the specific stage of the outbreak for maximum impact may
be impossible without reliable data to build up an epidemic curve, while calculating
attack  rates  may  be  impossible  due  to  poor  surveillance  and  a  lack  of  reliable
population  figures.  In  addition,  with  some epidemics,  reliable  and  rapid  diagnostic
methods and effective treatment for the disease do not yet exist.  
37 Significant delays in response in humanitarian contexts by governmental authorities
are often underpinned by a lack of emergency preparation, contingency planning and
funds to  implement such a  response.  From MSF’s  experience in the field  and from
discussions with other partners, there is one common claim of why UN, government,
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and non-governmental actors are late—funds are insufficient, late or misused. Of the
actors  willing  to  respond to  emergencies,  almost  all  point  to  an  absence  of  timely
funding for intervening or scaling up a response. 
38 Beyond  the  cry  for  money,  political  decisions  play  a  major  role  in  the  ability  of
organisations and governments to launch a response to an epidemic. Multi-mandate
agencies with long-term development goals, that  at the same time claim to be very
active in emergency response, are in a difficult position. Their response to epidemics is
usually  linked  to  specific  appeals,  and  the  essential  human  resources  or  technical
expertise for responding to an epidemic are limited, therefore curbing their ability to
respond  directly  to  an  epidemic.  Furthermore,  long-term  partners  of  Ministries  of
Health engaged in capacity building and health system strengthening usually favour
good relationships with the authorities and remain silent as long as the situation is not
totally out of control. 
39 The WHO has not been exempt from these tensions. Criticisms have been made of its
lack of investment in emergency response and of its organisational culture, including
its internal politics, which impede swift action. Several evaluations and reviews of the
2014  Ebola  response  mention  the  WHO’s inadequate  reaction,  while  some  even
recommend  that  the  scope  of  the  WHO’s  work  needs  to  be  redirected  to  its  core
competencies in order to ensure an appropriate response to epidemics (Carafano et al.,
2015). The independent panel mandated to review the Ebola response highlights that
‘for the WHO to be fit for emergency response, the organization needs the political will
and resources of its member states’ (WHO, 2015b). There seems to be a consensus that
the  political  will  of  the  member  states  and  a  change  in  organisational  culture  are
indispensable elements to guaranteeing an appropriate emergency response. 
40 MSF is one of the world’s firefighters; it is geared for this and acknowledges that not all
organisations have the financial independence to act in this way. However, response to
epidemics should be taken into account in any long-term programme, and sufficient
resources should be allocated for them. When an epidemic strikes, only a very limited
number of actors are ready to set up case management centres. One recent example is
the 2014 measles outbreak in N’Djamena, Chad. When a measles epidemic was declared,
there was no organisation other than MSF capable of or willing to support the Ministry
of Health with case management. Vaccination campaigns launched with the support of
Ministry  of  Health’s  partners  (UN  agencies,  the  WHO  and  international  non-
governmental organisations) were not fully successful and the outbreak continued to
devastate the capital. MSF reinforced public health facilities with extra staff, ensured
that medical  supplies were available in health centres and treated more than 1,700
measles  patients—the majority of  them unvaccinated despite  an official  vaccination
campaign coverage rate of 100 per cent (MSF, 2014). 
41 The lack of operational capacity in aid organisations is one of the main constraints to
mounting an appropriate response to epidemics. In health, the WHO has an advisory
role and lacks the capacity in-country to deploy experts for direct case management or
the implementation of outbreak control measures,  claiming this is  not its  mandate.
This leaves Ministries of Health to ‘get on with the job’, but unfortunately in a number
of countries where epidemics occur these ministries are not in a position to respond
properly either. As a result, there is a need for other partners to step up and provide
hands-on support in the early days of the emergency, which rarely happens.  
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42 Because country mechanisms are fixed towards the EPI and SIAs, epidemics are highly
sensitive  politically.  The  policies  of  influential  global  actors  such  Gavi  or  the  GPEI
reinforce this situation, favouring planned campaigns of eradication or control rather
than reactive  vaccination campaigns.  On several  occasions  MSF has  been forced  to
postpone mass measles vaccination campaigns in response to outbreaks because ‘polio
days’ or SIAs were scheduled.
43 Delays can also be linked to problems in the importation of  vaccines,  to diagnostic
methods, new treatments or even visas for emergency teams. International aid workers
ready to  fly  in  to implement  an emergency response can wait  days  or  weeks  until
permits are ready.9
44 Another constraint when responding to vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks is the
inability of responders to import vaccines with using the Ministry of Health/UNICEF
supply  chain.  In  some  countries,  such  as  South  Sudan,  Myanmar  and  Kenya,  it  is
impossible to import vaccines into the country, and all immunisation activities need to
be authorised by the Ministry of Health. It is understandable that Ministries of Health
want to control  health activities;  however,  in areas where the health system is  not
functional,  the  inability  to  import  vaccines  outside  that  system  further  impairs
emergency response.  If  there is  an outbreak or  alert  in  an area without functional
health  facilities,  time  is  wasted  gathering  all  the  permits  necessary  for  emergency
actors to act,  or—in worst-case scenarios—no authorisation is given and there is no
reactive  vaccination  response.  Delays  can  also  be  caused  by  hindrances  regarding
authorisations related to particular antigens, target groups or specific areas.
45 Sometimes, the necessary vaccines are not available in sufficient quantities to cover
large  target  populations,  either  in-country,  in  stockpiles  or  at  the  supplier  level.
Recently,  an  unexpected  meningitis  C  epidemic  struck  Niger,  revealing  that  the
stockpile of meningitis vaccines was heavily underestimated. Meanwhile, a shortage of
the oral cholera vaccine stock necessary to respond to worldwide needs exposed its
manufacturer’s inability to scale up production to respond to increased requirements, a
situation that  is  partially  linked to irregular demand (MSF Access Campaign,  2015).
When confronted with several requests, the stockpile may not be replenished quickly
enough.  With insufficient  vaccines  for  the  whole  population in  need,  tensions  may
arise. The political risks—for the authorities—of providing vaccines to only a section of
the  population can be  substantial,  and may lead  to  a  decision  not  to  implement  a
reactive vaccination campaign.
46 The  governance  of  the  aid  system  also  has  a  role  to  play.  In  the  current  system,
discordant voices are difficult  to hear within the cluster;10 the overlapping roles of
donor, coordinator and implementer make it difficult for some actors to divert from
their chosen path. The strategic decision is taken collectively so the responsibility for
its failure is traceable to no one (Biquet, 2013). A relatively recent extreme example of
this  was  the  notable  absence  of  actors  responding at  the  beginning  of  the  cholera
epidemic in Haiti in 2010. There had been a plethora of actors (and funds) to respond to
the devastating consequences of the earthquake suffered earlier that year, an event
which triggered the implementation of a post-disaster emergency response. However,
the  only  first  responders  to  this  new  emergency  within  an  emergency  were  the
organisations that had stayed outside the cluster strategy. These were MSF and the
Cuban Brigades and between them they treated 80 per cent of all Haitian cholera cases
in 2010/11 (Binder, 2013). 
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47 While  Biquet  (2013)  and Binder  (2013)  disagree  on the  condemnation of  the  entire
system based solely on the Haiti example, both agree that—in this particular case—the
cluster system played a role in collectively endorsing a strategy that proved not to be
the best at addressing the urgent needs of the population facing the epidemic. 
 
5.2 Missing the Tools: Failure of Current Research and Development Policies
48 Ebola exposed the failures of, and presented opportunities with regards to, how our
biomedical R&D system delivers solutions for outbreaks and emergencies. 
49 In the current research and development (R&D) model,  medical needs and resource
allocation do not match. Companies developing new products recover their R&D costs
by charging high rates protected via patent monopolies. Tropical diseases frequently
affect  rural,  isolated  and  impoverished  populations,  thereby  attracting  limited
investment.  Diseases  like  tuberculosis,  kala-azar  or  Ebola  get  nowhere  near  the
investment  in  research  that  diseases  with  more  lucrative  markets  do.  Medical
innovation is driven by the health problems of the rich, neglecting the poor.
50 Already  in  2006  over  280  scientists  wrote  to  the  WHO  requesting  an  alternative
framework. The same year, the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation
and  Public  Health  also  proposed  that  alternative  mechanisms  should  be  found  to
ensure the availability of affordable and technologically appropriated medical tools to
respond to the health needs of developing countries. 
51 At the request of its member states, the WHO set up a Consultative Expert Working
Group on R&D Financing and Coordination in 2010.  Over  the last  12  months,  some
progress has been made in certain areas, partly due to the efforts of the WHO. 
52 Before the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, some investments had been made though
not  necessarily  always  for  target  populations  in  Africa.  In  addition,  lack  of
prioritization before the epidemic meant that projects often developed at a snail’s pace
—something that radically changed at the height of the outbreak. Finally, and more in
general, little thought has been given to how rapid access to such tools will work in the
context of an emergency.
53 Significant challenges have also presented themselves with regards to when to access
products  for  compassionate  or  emergency  use,11 how  to  conduct  R&D  during
emergencies, how to coordinate regulatory processes and how best to bank and share
bio-samples. Unfortunately many of these issues may apply to, and if so will be critical
in, future outbreaks of a range of infectious diseases. 
 
Conclusion
54 Whilst we can anticipate some epidemics in known high-risk zones, and take action to
prevent them, there will be cases where a rapid, reactive response will still be required.
55 It is clear that there is no one ‘magic bullet’ to improve reactivity to epidemics. Many
factors have led to a situation in which epidemic response is neglected. These are a
consequence  of  global  health  priorities,  where  the  overarching  policy  priority  is
prevention and health system strengthening. While there have been notable gains, the
risk of epidemics has simultaneously heightened. Rapid urbanisation without proper
planning,  mass  population  movements,  climate  change,  and  crop  resistance  to
pesticides and other available treatments can and will increase the risk of epidemics in
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the  future.  Dengue  fever,  malaria,  chikungunya  and  viral  haemorrhagic  fevers  are
increasingly  being  reported  in  unusual  geographical  locations,  and  are  threatening
larger populations, adding to the problem of new and emerging pathogens worldwide.
56 The majority of health systems and communities in low-income countries are far from
achieving resilience. Pursuing the goal of resilient populations in the long run should
not  distract  from  immediate  action,  nor  should  it  prevent  governments  and
international actors from supporting those who are willing to launch an emergency
response, which they can do by removing blockages and constraints. 
57 When there are financial choices to be made, emergency capacity seems to be one of
the  first  elements  to  be  sacrificed  by  international  organisations.  Maintaining
emergency  teams  with  skilled  personnel  is  costly  and  difficult  to  justify  when
emergencies come and go. However, investing in emergency response should not be
questioned in ‘good years’, otherwise responders will be unprepared when an epidemic
hits. 
58 Epidemics  challenge  national  capacities,  and aid  actors  (MSF included)  should  help
governments  to  translate  contingency  plans  into  reality.  Closing  the  gap  between
theory  and  practical  implementation  is  one  of  the  main  challenges  for  emergency
response.  Almost  all  governments  have  emergency  preparedness  and  contingency
plans;  however,  the  holes  in  those  plans  only  appear  when  the  time  comes  to
implement them. All  aspects  of  a  response can be covered on paper,  but—in MSF’s
experience—this  does  not  always  translate  into  patients  being  treated  or  activities
being fully implemented. 
59 Having reached 2015—the date set for achieving the MDGs—a new set of objectives is
being  agreed  upon.  The  call  for  the  private  sector  to  step  in  and  support  the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) may be a positive initiative, but only if the goal
of ensuring universal access to health remains the main focus. Not taking into account
the needs of a population in the context in which they live, and focusing instead on
reinforcing health systems, should be avoided. The approach, in terms of preparation,
alert  and  response,  needs  to  be  tailored  to  the  local  reality.  Engaging  in  new and
comprehensive  structural  reforms  of  institutions—reforms  that  will  take  years  to
achieve and bear fruit—can become a futile exercise. Any vision of ‘the future’ should
not be at the expense of present-day realities. 
60 International interest in investing to contain outbreaks with pandemic potential within
the borders of nation states where they occur should not be the only guiding force for
response. The current system needs to be reviewed and reformed to respond to the
local needs of populations affected by epidemics, even those epidemics that do not pose
an international  threat.  Chen and Takemi (2015)  expressed it  succinctly  when they
write,  ‘what  makes  Ebola  different  from  the  many  other  epidemics  is  the  fear  of
contagion that the lethal disease has precipitated among the public, especially in rich
countries. When the rich and powerful feel threatened, global political priorities are
accordingly  redirected’.  Many  epidemics  will  never  lead  to  the  rich  and  powerful
feeling threatened, and as a result, people will continue to suffer. Let us not wait for a
new wake-up call. Today we need to prioritise the response to epidemics in a way that
ensures adapted and rapid mechanisms of identification and response to outbreaks, of
whatever size.
61 Unless surveillance, alert and response are guaranteed at a micro-level, the world will
never  have  a  functional  global  warning  and  response  system  for  epidemics  or
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pandemics. Continued weaknesses in local and national outbreak response could result
in the collapse of the global system. Imagine for one moment that Ebola had been an
air-transmissible pathogen that was highly infectious during the incubation period. In
this scenario, the local failures in outbreak response would have had a massive impact
worldwide, as even highly performing health systems would have struggled to cope
with hundreds or thousands of cases that ensued. This is a risk we cannot afford to
take.
 
Comments by Ilona Kickbusch | Ebola 2014/15—Why
the International Health Regulations Are Critical 
1. Introduction
62 The paper by Monica Rull is a very balanced piece on systems failings in relation to
Ebola. No one organisation can be faulted; no magic bullet exists.  We must try to use
the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ and the policy space that has emerged through the Ebola
Crisis to improve the system.  This was also very much the approach taken by the WHO
Interim  Assessment  Panel  on  Ebola  on  which  I  served.  In  that  capacity  I  had  the
opportunity  to  participate  in  many  meetings  at  which  the  response  to  Ebola  was
discussed. Based on these experiences, I want to share some of my personal thoughts
on the relevance of the International Health Regulations—and what might be done to
strengthen them. I hope this indicates some routes that could be taken in relation to
some of the system weaknesses that Monica Rull identifies. 
63 From the very beginning each global health crisis must be recognised in its societal,
political and economic dimensions. These must be understood and managed.  Global
health security is no longer an issue of North and South—of charity or self interest, but
rather one of common danger, while recognising that some regions of the world have a
much  higher  vulnerability  than  others  due  to  history,  geopolitics  and  ecological
developments. The most recent Ebola outbreak has shown again that all countries (at
all  levels  from  local  to  national)  and  the  international  community  must  be  better
prepared for outbreaks with very different characteristics. 
64 Contrary to Monica Rull I am in favour of the term ‘global health security’. It is my
opinion that we must overcome a narrow understanding of global health security as the
securitization of public health and begin to frame it in the context of human security,
human rights, solidarity and social protection. Global health security is about saving
lives and addressing the unacceptable health inequalities that expose some countries to
health crisis more than others.
 
2. The International Health Regulations (IHR)
65 We live in a global-risk society—with the International Health Regulations (IHR) the
world has a unique,  legally binding governance mechanism that aims to protect all
countries,  especially  the  most  vulnerable,  from  cross-border  public  health  threats
when they occur. It is an instrument of global solidarity to protect all. This is not yet
fully  understood,  therefore  a  political  climate  that  supports  the  investment  of
resources in IHR capacities in all countries must be created and maintained—none can
be  excluded;  free-riders  cannot  be  accepted.  Health  events  must  be  taken  more
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seriously  both  because  people  have  a  human  right to  health  and  because  of  the
potential of health events to cause crises in other sectors and throughout society. Such
recognition emerged after the Ebola Crisis but could disappear quickly as the next crisis
—in another sector—arrives.
66 The experience with each new outbreak allows for the improvement of the instruments
and mechanisms at hand and these will in turn require quite different lead actors to
orchestrate the response. For example, the revised International Health Regulations
were adopted under the strong impression of an airborne outbreak—SARS. Ebola was
the first Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in resource-poor
settings that required the significant involvement of humanitarian actors, led to the
involvement of political bodies such as the African Union and initiated a new type of
United Nations  involvement—the first  ever  UN health mission,  UNMEER.  The Ebola
experience has now initiated a review of the International Health Regulations—possibly
new regimes and new approaches will be added to the existing instruments. 
 
3. The Basics
67 The  International  Health  Regulations  (IHR)  are  about  preventing  the  international
spread of diseases.  All  countries agreed to put in place mechanisms to—in a timely
manner—detect, assess, notify and report events and respond to public health risks so
that  a  public  health  emergency of  international  concern (PHEIC)  could  be  avoided.
Ebola  has  highlighted  again  just  how  vulnerable  countries  with  very  weak  health
systems are—any outbreak also endangers treatment for many other health conditions,
and the numbers of deaths of the poorest multiply. For all to be safe we need to invest
in the weakest link and in the health of the most vulnerable—the motivation to do so
will  always be a  mixture of  humanitarian,  human rights,  security and health-based
arguments. 
68 The Sustainable Development Goals have provided a new road map for the integrated
investment that will be required—much of which will not be in the health sector. Yet
Ebola has also shown that even the most advanced economies and health systems are
not sufficiently prepared for outbreaks—neither to contribute to international surge
capacity nor to provide full security ‘at home’. Necessary supportive mechanisms are
bound together  in  a  system of  interdependence  between the  Global  North  and the
Global South, between preparedness and response as well as treatment and care, and
between different governance levels and many different sectors.  No outbreak can be
handled by the health sector alone.
69 A number of assessment panels have been established to make recommendations in the
aftermath of Ebola. The first was the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel established by the
Executive Board of the World Health Organisation; it delivered its report in July 2015.
Other panels include the Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola convened
by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and the Harvard Global Health
Institute and a high-level United Nations panel on the Global Response to Health Crises
—both will report at the end of 2016. Finally, the US National Academy of Medicine will
serve as  the secretariat  for  an international,  independent,  multi-stakeholder expert
commission to create a global health risk framework for the future. The commission
will  conduct a study and prepare a report in which it  will  recommend an effective
global  architecture  for  recognising  and  mitigating  the  threat  of  infectious  disease
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epidemics.  Finally the WHO has established a Review Committee on the Role of the
International Health Regulations in the Ebola Outbreak and Response.
70 Even  though  the  final  reports  are  not  yet  available  the  discussions  between  these
panels show that there is consensus on a number of basic points— 
Institutions matter: investments in universal health coverage and in the IHR are critical.
Integration  matters: health  system  preparedness  has  two  dimensions—a  functioning
health system accessible to all and a public health infrastructure that includes the capacities
required under the IHR; too frequently they have not been seen as ONE agenda.
Other sectors matter: both preparedness and response require action far beyond the health
sector, including other ministries, the private sector, NGOs and humanitarian actors—as well
as the security sector.
Human rights  matter: the  best  basis  for  health  security  is  human  security  and  social
protection.
The  UN  matters:  the  United  Nations  system  is  critical  but  needs  to  be  much  better
prepared and better financed to act effectively in global health crises. Cooperation—between
the UN, civil  society,  humanitarian actors and the private sector,  and in some cases the
security sector—is critical.
71 The  Ebola  Crisis  has  laid  bare  some  of  the  weaknesses  in  systems  as  they  stand
presently, including a weak World Health Organisation, a lack of highest level political
commitment  (national  actors,  regional  bodies,  political  clubs,  UNSC)  and  a  lack  of
transparency, information sharing and accountability within and between countries.
Countries often lack supportive legal frameworks and mechanisms to deal with health
crises and at the national, regional and the global level there is a lack of surge capacity.
There is a consistent call for well-coordinated partnerships and the breaking down of
silos and of course for financial mechanisms to ensure rapid emergency response.  All
of these stand or fall with the willingness to invest in health and its determinants. 
 
4. Recognition of the Relevance of the IHR 
72 The UN and WHO must send a clear message on the relevance of the IHR. This has been
severely neglected because the IHR were/are seen by many as  a  tool  of  the health
sector  only  and  global  health  advocacy  groups  have  not  been  committed  to  IHR
implementation.  BUT  viruses  cross  borders.  They  can  affect  everybody.  They  can
weaken  communities,  destroy  the  social  fabric  and  destabilise  countries.  They  can
severely  impact  economy  and  trade,  and  can  impact  on  the  relationships  between
countries and peoples. As a consequence a very wide range of actors has to understand
the high relevance of the IHR and the consequences of non-compliance. 
73 This  is  not  a  negligible  issue:  countries  both  rich  and poor  will  have  to  deal  with
outbreaks on a regular basis—be they in the local hospital, regional, national, cross-
border or global. Societies as a whole must be better prepared and better understand
the nature of outbreaks. Trust building is critical both to counteracting unnecessary
fear and to securing compliance from the community in the case of an outbreak. The
relevance of the IHR must be systematically communicated to and understood by heads
of  state  and government  and political  leaders  including  regional  organisations  and
political clubs: UNSC, UNGA and UNSG, as well as most UN agencies, ministers of health
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organisations, NGOs and major foundations, the security and the foreign policy sectors,
business leaders and development banks, and the media and the general public. 
 
5. The Need for Integrated Financing Mechanisms 
74 As many countries do not have the resources to fulfil their IHR obligations, financial
mechanisms need to be established to support them. The IHR should be considered a
global public good that benefits all, and funding mechanisms should be shared between
countries and other actors as the production of global public goods benefits both the
public and the private sector.  The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is a step in
the right direction of mutual support between countries, providing financial resources
but  also  sharing  expertise.  Countries  should  see  this  kind  of  investment  in
preparedness as their ‘insurance policy’ in a global-risk society. No country will be able
to protect itself on its own through national security mechanisms. 
75 But the potential impact of the next outbreak should lead to the consideration of a
reliable  global  financing mechanism—beyond overseas development assistance—that
allows  resource-poor  countries  to  access  funds  in  recognition  of  their  political
commitment to IHR at home.  While such a mechanism is being discussed, in relation to
the  risks  posed  by  outbreaks,  by  the  WHO  and the  World  Bank—the  Pandemic
Emergency  Financing  Facility—the  financing  gap  with  regards  to  ensuring
preparedness and fulfilling IHR obligations remains. This must be addressed at high-
level donor meetings, in the context of the UN General Assembly, G7 and G20 meetings
and South-South  initiatives,  at  BRICS  meetings  and  by  regional  bodies  such  as  the
African Union. The private sector can play an important role here as it is also severely
affected by outbreaks,  as  SARS and Ebola clearly showed.  Airlines,  tourism and the
banking industry are each a case in point.
76 The need for a new financing mechanism also applies to the financing of the research
required on neglected tropical diseases, diagnostics, vaccines, treatments, technologies,
etc. Working groups are meeting to discuss this and present proposals. For example a
WHO blueprint for research and development is under way, which will also address
issues that hampered the Ebola effort such as ownership of samples and results during
an outbreak, rules for clinical trials, etc. A supportive environment for research during
an outbreak—led by clear rules and ethics—is essential.
 
6. Political Accountability for Preparedness
77 Governments  have  a  responsibility  towards  their  own  populations,  the  global
community at large and the most vulnerable. The treaty nature of the IHR must be
recognised and understood as a policy mechanism of interdependence by all  actors.
Preparedness has been seen very technically in the context of a public health response
rather than as whole-of-government and whole-of-society preparedness to deal with
infectious disease outbreaks and threats in the twenty-first century. Politicians, the
media, a wide range of societal actors and the general public need to understand the
mechanisms at work, how well their country (together with others and compared to
others) is prepared, and who is responsible for acting should an outbreak occur and
who  can,  thus,  be  held  accountable.  The  same  applies  to  regional  bodies  and
organisations. 
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78 With the signing of  the revised International  Health Regulations (IHR) the member
states  of  the  WHO committed  to  global  cooperation,  transparency,  compliance  and
accountability.  Compliance  with  the  IHR  has  not  been  a  high  political  priority  for
countries,  nor has any lack of  compliance been visible  or  the subject  of  a  critique,
beyond that of health experts. This must change—as with other international treaties
there need to be reliable independent assessments.  The GHSA has moved in a good
direction to work with a peer review approach. Regional centres for disease control can
provide valuable support  where national  capacity is  still  weak or  countries  are too
small  to  maintain  certain  response  mechanisms.  But  this  is  not  enough.  The  WHO
Interim Panel has proposed an annual Global Health Security Report as an approach to
creating  more  transparency  and  accountability.  Such  an  independent  reporting
structure on global health security could possibly be established by the UN Secretary
General. 
79 Because of the treaty nature of the IHR and because of the global consequences of non-
compliance, such an inter-sectoral report would need to reach far beyond the health
sector—providing  data  on  the  global  health  security  situation  and  the  state  of
preparedness, and giving examples of successful responses to outbreaks and updates on
significant research and the like. It should also include the identification of areas at
risk.  For example, it would report not only on health systems, but on the preparedness
of the airline industry, of the tourism sector or of border security. Such a report aimed
at the wider international community would also contribute to a better understanding
of  the  many  different  actors  involved  in  ensuring  global  health  security  through
regular assessments of their respective contributions.  
 
7. Incentives Must Be Created and Accountability Must Be Ensured 
80 With the signing of the revised International Health Regulations all countries agreed to
report events of international public health importance. This is an act of international
solidarity, which countries must undertake and in relation to which they must not be
penalised  but  rather  supported.   The  IHR require  of  countries  that  they  put  global
health security for all—a global public good—above short-term national interests.  It
must be accepted that this is more difficult for some countries than others. Therefore a
system  of  incentives  must  be  developed  to  establish  IHR  compliance  in  all  four
dimensions:  detect,  assess,  report  and  respond.  Political  and  financial  support  in
particular  must  be  made available  rapidly  so  that  countries  do  not  shy away from
reporting events.  
81 The inter-sectoral nature of preparedness and response has been made very clear by
the Ebola outbreak. In consequence, opportunities for regular exchange need to be put
in place between the WHO and a wide range of other agencies if all those concerned are
to better understand the nature of health crises and emergencies and be better aware
of  the  tasks  and potential  of  the  other  actors  involved.  Many existing  cooperation
arrangements can be used for this. In the Ebola crisis it was the humanitarian system,
but depending on the nature of the health crisis this can change. Regular discussions
between, and joint simulations carried out by, agencies can be helpful, health security
can be on the agenda of other agencies and they—including NGOs, civil society actors
and the media—must be better aware of what the WHO's role and responsibilities are.
This can help to avoid misunderstandings.  
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82 Often,  political  and  economic  interests  might  caution  against  reporting—therefore
incentive mechanisms need to be introduced to help ensure transparency. Countries
must  not  pay  a  price  for  acting  responsibly;  rather  their  reporting  activities  must
trigger both finances AND a reliable support system. These measures can include: a
rapid assessment of  needs—carried out  jointly  with the country concerned,  a  rapid
response  force  being  made  available,  financial  support  being made  accessible  for
operations as well as for treatment, equipment, etc., and a rapid communication effort
being  made  both  with  communities  and  the  global  media.  The  WHO's  role  in  the
sharing of information under the IHR requires more clarification—its authority to do so
must be clearly underlined and global  norms must be established in view of global
risks. In the same spirit countries should refrain from introducing additional measures
that  are not  justified by the IHR.  Free-riding should be reduced to  the minimum—
egotistic behaviour should be made public. While it is recognised that there are many
different reasons for introducing such measures, both political and economic, it is also
recognised that calling countries to account will be essential. 
83 Since this is a difficult role for the WHO in the aftermath of a crisis there needs to be an
independent analysis of such measures—including travel and trade restrictions—and
their  impact,  possibly  in  the  context  of  the  annual  Global  Health  Security  report
mentioned above. In the spirit of transparency, countries and other actors can respond
to this assessment and explain their actions. While it  will  be difficult to implement
sanctions in the present system, inappropriate or unjustified actions must be made
public. In cases where significant trade impact is likely, it might be possible to take the
issue to the WTO dispute panel.  Should the actions of the country—or other actors,
such as airlines—be proved to have hampered or threatened the response capacity of
the international community (for example by making it difficult for health workers to
reach the affected areas) it should possibly be taken to the UNSC.
 
8. IHR Clarity of Procedures and the Declaration of a PHEIC
84 The exact authority of the WHO and the procedures and resources in place in relation
to  the  IHR  are  not  spelled  out  clearly  enough.  Many  countries  do  not  know  or
understand them. This must be addressed in a serious fashion. It must be made clear to
all actors—especially outside Ministries of Health—where the WHO's responsibility lies,
what it is tasked to do and what resources are available to do it.  The WHO must report
regularly on its capacities, at all levels of the organisation, to its member states and the
international community at large. 
85 Much has been made of the declaration of a PHEIC. But, at present, the declaration of a
PHEIC is no more than a strong call to action. It does NOT, at this point, allow the WHO
or other actors to access the resources—financial, political and operational—that come
with such a  declaration.  This  must  change.  It  must  be  clearly  mapped out  what  is
triggered when a PHEIC is declared—that is to say, a meeting involving the UN Security
Council  and  the  heads  of  state  of  the  countries  concerned,  that  the  countries  and
organisations concerned gain access to resources (financial, people, equipment, etc.),
and rapid preparedness in all countries. Surge capacity must be ensured at the national
and the international level.  A PHEIC could, for example, trigger a global coordination
mechanism jointly chaired by the SG and the DG of the WHO. 
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86 The declaration of a PHEIC is a measure of last resort. This is why it has been suggested
by the WHO Interim Panel that an intermediate level of warning be introduced that
would  rapidly  free  up  the  resources  required  to  keep  an  outbreak  under  control.
Financial mechanisms must be available to contain public health threats where they
are occurring, before it is necessary to declare a PHEIC. In some cases, if a country has
neither  the  capacity  nor  the  will  to  address  an  outbreak  that  has  the  potential  of
becoming  a  PHEIC,  political  legitimacy  must  enable  mandatory  action  to  be  taken,
possibly approved by the UNSC. Formal evaluations of the response must take place at
all levels and be made available in the spirit of global solidarity and transparency. 
87 Functioning structures at a country level are the cornerstone of the IHR. Together with
other  partners—such  as  the  GHSA—the  WHO  must  support  countries  in  ensuring
preparedness. This must become a key function of WHO country offices. The head of
each WHO country office must be in regular contact with the country IHR focal point to
regularly assess IHR capacity. This also includes an assessment of domestic civilian and
security  actors.  Outbreaks  and  crises  must  be  anticipated—countries  must  look
critically at methods of coordination and at command and control structures. Based on
such assessments, a significant capacity-building and training effort will be required. 
 
9. In Summary
88 Countries must be supported to create whole-of-government agencies or platforms that
break down programmatic silos of health, science and security actors. Countries could
begin to produce regular national health security reports as the nature of the threat
changes.  In particular,  the role of the security sector and its assets (including local
police, border guards, logistics, etc.) must be assessed and guidelines provided.  It is
important to note here that each IHR national focal point should be understood as a
supportive structure, not as one individual. 
89 The WHO should also encourage cooperation between, and the running of combined
simulations  by,  neighbouring  countries  in  order  to  implement  IHR  requirements—
especially in relation to border areas and ‘border spaces’. Countries with key airline
hubs, ports, etc. have special responsibilities and must be supported in keeping them
functioning and in responding appropriately.  Cooperation with major airlines is of the
essence.  To  support  countries,  the  WHO  must  provide  guidelines  for  national
preparedness  and  response  plans,  both  based  on  a  whole-of-society  and  whole-of-
government response. It must also relate to countries what specific profile is required
of the IHR counterpart and how to conduct outbreak response simulations at different
levels of governance.
90 The  more  countries,  sectors  and  agencies  are  willing  to  cooperate  in  terms  of
preparedness  and  response,  the  closer  we  are  to  global  health  security  for  all.
Cooperation between developed and developing countries has already been highlighted
above—all will need to be better prepared and all have something to learn from the
others. Cooperation builds trust, and this is probably the most important asset in the
face of an outbreak. The first step is to make the implementation of the IHR a political
priority.
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Comments by Helen Lauer | Ebola 2014/15 - Questions
About Global Attention to Africa’s Chronic Contagions 
91 Monica Rull is commendably concerned about the inequities in the global health arena
with regard to addressing “vaccine preventable diseases” [28]12—viz. unless these are
presented  as  immanent  threats  to  affluent  populations  in  G-8  countries,  they  are
largely ignored. But two pressing questions arise from this article and Ilona Kickbusch’s
erudite  reply:  (Q1)  Does  anybody  know  with  reasonable  certainty  which  of  the
chronically  fatal  diseases  are  in  fact  vaccine-preventable  in  the ambient  conditions
plaguing the world’s poorest populations? And (Q2) are African countries really better
off when a public health crisis they face is publicized and addressed as a global health
threat?  For  instance,  with  regard to  (Q1),  although it  is  clear  that  the  rotavirus  is
causally responsible for vast numbers of infant and toddler deaths worldwide, it is by
no means clear that universal vaccination is the most effective front line response to
the acute gastro-enteritis endemic throughout those regions of the world where public
health is chronically neglected.
 
1. Long versus short term: a false dichotomy for addressing
epidemics in Africa
92 According to Christian Fiala PhD, Doctor of Medicine (an OB/GYN specialist based in
Vienna, whose experience spans several decades as a General Practitioner in Tanzanian
and Ugandan field clinics and public hospitals): there is no need for a diarrhoea vaccine
in Africa; rather, what is needed with unequivocal urgency is safe drinking water. So
too in West  Africa,  according to  the progressive public  health expert,  Phyllis  Mary
Antwi PhD (who has formerly worked with the Ghana Ministry of Health and taught at
the University of Ghana School of Public Health, and is now Honorary Secretary of the
Faculty of Public Health in the Ghana College of Doctors and Surgeons). Such is the case
in Ghana: apart from the fact that no single cholera or diarrhoea vaccine shot will last a
lifetime,  channelling  billions  of  research dollars  into  the  discovery  and delivery  of
affordable,  mass  marketable  vaccines  severely  impedes  both  short  and  long  term
solutions to chronic water-borne contagions including cholera. 
93 As  both  Monica  Rull  and  Ilona  Kickbusch  stress  [20,  59,  63],  productively  tackling
Africa’s dire public health challenges requires context-sensitive information specific to
concrete situations. So to continue with Ghana’s deeply rooted sanitation crisis: this
dates back at least to the 1880s, when the British Gold Coast was the only colony in
West  Africa  without  any  drainage  systems whatsoever  (Addae,  1996,  79,  392,  480).
Effective  health  care  delivery  long  term,  and  to  save  infant  and  toddlers’  lives
immediately, requires a root and branch reaction to the endemic faecal contamination
of  drinking  water,  by  generalizing  piped  water  into  all  homes,  enforcing  those
construction  code  statutes  that  already  exist  to  ensure  universal  availability of
residential toilets, investing in municipal sewerage, drainage and sanitation systems,
and  otherwise  eradicating  the  dangers  of  rampant  open  defecation  whereby  faecal
matter seeps into streams through rain run-off every wet season. Rolling out a national
cholera or diarrhoea vaccination programme is likely to defeat fiscal support for any
immediate or comprehensive solution to the pandemic crisis of water-borne fatalities
due  to  infected  public  water  supplies.  Rull  herself  points  out  [55]  that  gut-related
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epidemics are likely to worsen dramatically  in the next generation,  with rising sea
levels and global temperatures forcing mass migrations of flood and drought refugees
to overwhelm the already disintegrated infrastructures and economies of coastal cities
throughout the tropics.13 In Ghana this requires addressing the huge disparity between
social services available in the northern and coastal regions.14 Today the rate of infant
mortality  remains  about  twice  as  great  in  Ghana’s  three  Northern  Regions  as  the
national average, and well over three times that of the Greater Accra Region, locus of
the nation’s highest condensation of wealth. As Rull and Kickbusch observe [11, 59, 63],
without diligent efforts to address causal factors related to the historical, political and
economic circumstances underlying chronic contagions, egregious domestic inequities
get reproduced by global interventions. For instance, it was in accord with the new
1994 Health Reform Act, when the Ghana Ministry of Health shifted its agenda from
community outreach and preventive health care delivery to comply with international
conventions by hosting the Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI). The scheme
failed to meet its initial goal of immunizing 80 per cent of the child population. And as
each year new children are born, as of July 2004 only 69 per cent of all children were
fully  immunised  (Ghana  Statistical  Service  et  al.,  2004).  The  rest  of  the  children
remained as vulnerable to disease outbreaks as if no immunity technology had been
brought in. 
94 Of  course,  as  Rull  is  keenly  aware  and  mentions  at  length,  universal  coverage
throughout  a  population has  been the  greatest  challenge of  EPI  since  its  inception
around the world [30, 31, 41, 43, 44]. But the problem with EPI in Ghana was not the
government’s  lack  of  cooperation  or  failing  to  prioritise  children’s  health;  budget
allowances for health care were increased from 26 per cent of total expenditures at the
district level in 1996 to 60 per cent in 1998 (UNICEF, 2000). Rather, the problem was the
lock step compliance with an international public health agenda, implementing policies
that  had  never  engaged  the  district  level  health  officers  or  community  health
practitioners at the planning stages. Overall, EPI efficiency and effectiveness in Ghana
was severely hampered because global  health intervention protocols did not reflect
priorities  set  by  locally  based  African  expertise  and  experience.  Community
representatives were consulted to participate only in follow-up studies, to help with
measurable,  albeit  short-term,  snapshots  of  the programme’s  impact. Local  medical
officials around the country lamented EPI from the start. But to comply with global
vaccination initiatives, Ghana’s Ministry of Health revamped locally conceived policies
that  were  oriented  successfully  toward  preventive  care,  community  outreach  and
family support—shifting primary health care instead to foreign-directed, technology-
intensive  immunisation  schemes  and  centralized  hospital-based  service  provision.
Ghana’s engagement with EPI entailed losing health care personnel to conduct the mass
inoculation  exercises;  it  meant  dissolving  growth  monitoring  of  infants,  and
abandoning home visits by nurses for lack of time between inoculation cycles; mothers
were no longer advised by health care practitioners of  any basis  for bringing their
children under five to clinics; thus primary care for mother and child declined. Child
health and life expectancy deteriorated measurably and abruptly (UNICEF, 2000; UNDP,
2000; Ghana Statistical Service et al., 2004). The problem lay in abandoning strategies
that were working in order to prioritise foreign donor-driven directives.
95 Of course this  is  not  to suggest  that  vaccines are unimportant.  But if  locally  based
specialists had more of a direct say in defining what is wrong, and if there were more
bottom-up control over what is done to fix it, then the overall yield from the billions of
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dollars invested by foreign governments and private donors would likely be a more
germane, more varied, and a more effective response both in the short and long term
to specific regional contagions and consequent short life expectancies. 
96 Yet both Rull and Kickbusch urge that the way forward is to secure more—not less—
top-down engagement with outside agents [28, 33, 56, 68, 74, 75, 80, 82, 83]. Both regard
the root problems in establishing health security worldwide and locally as embedded in
the attitudes of African governments and ailing populations, i.e. a pervasive disrespect
for  rule  of  law,  inadequate  “compliance”  and  “cooperation”  with  international
initiatives [73, 78, 89, 90].
 
2. Command, control, compliance and cooperation
97 Prof. Kickbusch especially emphasises the need to establish trust among the partners
engaged  in  global  health  security,  and  notes  that  a  source  of  inefficiency  in
implementing IHR and emergency response is  the absence of  legal  statutes [71].  So
where legal statutes and political will for their enforcement do exist, why is it the case
that  global  institutions  dismiss  regulations  and  cut  corners,  displaying  a  vigilante
recklessness in their zeal to protect and cure? A glaring incident occurred in Ghana
beginning  in  May  2015,  well  after  the  regional  Ebola  crisis  in  other  countries  was
declared over. Because Ghana was fitted with three centres for malaria trials and the
population was Ebola-free, its bid was accepted to take part in the Phase II of an Ebola
vaccine trial, run by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the US National Institutes of Health
(NIH),  backed  by  the  World  Health  Organisation  (WHO).  The  trial  commenced
apparently without the informed consent of participants,  and without receiving the
statutory  required  approval  of  Ghana’s  Food  and  Drug  Authority.  A  heated  public
outcry ensued, and an esteemed independent scientific committee was established to
pursue  concerns  based  on  previous  evidence  of  problems  with  the  chimpanzee
adenovirus type 3 (ChAd3) methodology (Quershi et al., 2014; Thaci et al., 2011; Ghana
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2015; see also Ghana News, 2015). Subsequently GSK and
NIH withdrew their trial programme from Ghana—not because of legal obligations but
because in the interim they had gathered the requisite 30,000 samples to complete
their Phase II Trials using other West African countries. 
98 This incident of blatant disregard in the global arena for local African authority and
rule of law is not an isolated case. The Deputy Minister of Health in Liberia disclosed
early in October 2014 to the BBC World Service reporting from Monrovia that the highest
echelons  in  their  Ministry  had  neither  requested  intervention  nor  received  prior
knowledge  of  the  purpose  or  medical  capacities  of  three  thousand  US  military
personnel deployed to Liberia in October 2014 by directive of the US President. Health
care—be it emergency or systemic—provided through foreign authority backed by force
rather than by evidence-based best  practice,  has proven to be far from efficient or
productive.  Violent  force  was authorized throughout  2014 to  quell  both public  and
professional resistance to the invasive search and seizure activities under the aegis of
the  UN  coordinated  Ebola  crisis  response  in  Liberia,  which  was  overseen  not  by
medically trained practitioners but by non-medical military personnel from China, the
US Army, and the UK Royal Air Force (BBC, 2014a; 2014b; 2015). 
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3. Perpetuating African dependency upon foreign expertise
99 Rull and Kickbusch both detail the problems incurred in the handling of an outbreak
when  supplies  are  delayed,  when  stockpiles  are  miscalculated,  and  where  foreign
experts  are  deterred  while  waiting  for  authorisation  and  visa  clearances  to  travel
across borders [21, 30, 31, 41, 43-45, 49, 53-55]. This provokes a fundamental question
repeated  by  top  level  immunologists  and  epidemiologists  in  West  Africa—before,
during, and since the 2014 Ebola outbreak: why is there no grade P5 laboratory in the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region? It is commonplace that
only a laboratory and a repository with maximal capabilities can maintain serum from
recent  and  local  survivors  to  develop  maximally  effective  vaccines  in  the  shortest
possible time. The most advanced facility in West Africa is  the grade P3 laboratory
maintained in Ghana’s Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research (NMIMR)—but
this is suitable only for packing and sending samples away for further research and
development overseas.15 Consequently the emergency demand for more expensive and
less efficient foreign intervention is perpetuated. 
100 Why  is  research  and  development  of  ‘essential  medicines’  for  Africans  always
conducted  at  great  distances?  What  sustains  the  erroneous  assumption  that  in  the
domains of immunology and epidemiology, Africans require foreign technical initiative
and  expertise  to  command  and  control  epidemic  management?  This,  despite  the
demographic that nearly 80 per cent of imported medical personnel in the UK and USA
since  2000  derives  from specialists  trained  in  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  and
South Africa (Akosa, 2013).16 Why is 90 per cent of global funding allocated to non-
African research institutes where work is focused on just 10 per cent of the world’s
diseases; while roughly 90 per cent of the world’s diseases afflict populations in Africa?
 
4. Dubious diagnostics and misleading statistics
101 Even more disconcerting than the global inequities in fiscal resource allocation, and the
disregard for local African authority and rule of law from the global health community,
is  the  high  tolerance  for  error  and  shortfalls  in  the  rudiments  of  evidence-based
hypothesis and policy formation when the focus is on developing medical treatments
for virulent tropical diseases. The fact sheets and news releases produced about West
Africa by the US Centres for Disease Control and the World Health Organisation have
been anarchic over 2014-16. Flimsy methods of accumulating Ebola cases and related
deaths have always been masked by figures carrying apparent exactitude; including the
WHO statistics quoted by Rull [16]. After substituting the vague term “outbreak” for
“epidemic” (which has an operational meaning) in news releases to AP and Reuters as
of mid-October 2014, the WHO’s and the US CDC’s figures for cases of Ebola until March
2015  abruptly  acquired  a  level  of  pseudo-precision;  for  instance,  3,769  cases  were
reported in Liberia for one week in early October, changing with seemingly assiduous
rigour  each  week.  Yet  when  queried,  neither  the  CDC  nor  the  WHO  provided  any
statistics about how many Ebola-related deaths were under twelve years old, how many
were men, or how many died the same week of malaria, or of diabetic shock or gastro
enteritis or of malnutrition related diseases or upper respiratory infections including
tuberculosis—all  of  whose  symptoms  are  indiscernible  from  those  identified  most
recently with the Ebola Virus Disease. By 16 October, 2014, just prior to the US troop
deployment to Liberia, the WHO predicted that by the end of 2014 the number of new
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Ebola cases could reach 5,000 to 10,000 per week (according to Anthony Banbury, the
US State Department Ebola Coordinator and then Head of the UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response (UNMEER) (BBC,  2014a).  On 14 December,  2014 the number of
people in Sierra Leone with Ebola was reported to be 8,000 since the beginning of the
outbreak;  1,900  of  these  were  reported  to  have  been  fatal.  James  Gallagher,  global
health correspondent for the BBC, reported that a half a million cases were the lower
end of probability for Liberia, with cases doubling every 15 to 20 days (BBC, 2014b). But
these figures were bizarrely out of synch with figures reported only five days before.
The  CDC  publicized  alarmist  predictions  that  by  late  January  2015  there  would  be
almost 1.4 million cases of Ebola throughout West Africa. When these estimates prove
erroneous, there is no apparent retraction or concern. Yet without a comprehensive,
credible and accountable picture, there is really no way to assess the main causes of
death in Guinea, Liberia or Sierra Leone over the eighteen-month segment of an on-
going crisis sectioned off for global media attention in 2014-15.
102 The  papers  published  in  The  Lancet  originally  purporting  the  presence  of  Ebola  in
humans in Zaire (Bowen et al., 1977; Johnson et al., 1977; Pattyn et al., 1977) and later in
the Central African Republic (Johnson et al., 1993) have attracted criticism regarding
the  handling  of  specimens,  insufficiency  of  sample  sizes,  and  poor  quality  of  the
electro-microscopy.17 It remains unclear what, if any, connection the Ebola featured in
these studies has to the Ebola as diagnosed in 2014, for which one survey of forty four
cases  in  Sierra  Leone,  showed  only  one  patient  with  haemorrhagic  symptoms
(Schieffelin et al., 2014).
103 Even after the declared completion of the outbreak in January 2015, WHO conceded
they were still searching for a reliable test to detect Ebola. A recent three-year study in
Gabon involving nearly 5,000 healthy individuals (Becquart et al., 2010) established the
utter unreliability of the tests used nevertheless throughout the 2014-15 outbreak in
West Africa. Tens of thousands of people in Guinea failed to receive malaria treatment
because of capricious, ad hoc diagnoses of Ebola based on sheer location (Boseley, 2015).
To avoid such undermining effects on primary health care delivery, Ebola tests would
never be administered in the United States until typhoid, diabetic shock, and malaria
had been definitely ruled out. But in West Africa typhoid and malaria are endemic—
hence the ‘crisis’ continues anonymously. A further source of mayhem and distrust in
Guinea  was  caused  in  October  2014  by  the  US  CDC’s  failure  to  report  a  botched
meningitis  vaccine  campaign  which  resulted  in  an  outbreak  of  acute  fulminating
Mingococcal Septicemia, due to use of overheated vials.18 Since the CDC’s error went
unpublicized, the violent symptoms were alleged to be caused by Ebola. Such avoidable,
detrimental effects resulting from mismanagement by foreign agencies would never be
tolerated in a G-8 country without a major political and diplomatic meltdown. 
104 Lest there be any doubt about the accountability or qualifications of the international
agents  participating  in this  high  profile  global  emergency  operation—against  a
singularly  ubiquitous  pathogen  whose  very  identification  and  location  remained
elusive from the very beginning to the very end of the rescue mission—here is a list of
the partners who convened on 12 December, 2014, in response to the World Health
Organisation’s  call  for  “Ebola  diagnostics  [since]  the  efforts  to  contain  the  Ebola
outbreaks in West Africa [were] hampered by cumbersome, slow, complex and costly
diagnostic tests”: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Executive Director of their Access
Campaign, as well as the Director and Epidemiologist-Clinical Biologist of the Epicentre
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MSF in Paris, the MSF Diagnostics Advisor based in Geneva, both the Leader and the
Laboratory  Advisor  of  the  MSF  Diagnostic  Network  based  in  Amsterdam,  the  Chief
Scientific  Officer,  the  CEO,  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  the  Foundation  for
Innovative  New Diagnostics  (FIND),  the  Medical  Director  of  Fondation Mérieux,  the
Public Health Focal Point representative of the World Bank, a representative of the US
Naval  Medical  Research  Center,  the  Chief  of  the  Research  Department  in  Guinea’s
Ministry  of  Health,  a  member  of  staff  from  the  Infectious  and  Tropical  Diseases
Department of the National Hospital in Conakry, the National Case Management Chair
of  Ebola  Response  of  Liberia’s  Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Welfare,  the  WHO
representative  in  Liberia,  the  Senior  Program Officer  of  Diagnostics  of  the  Bill  and
Melinda  Gates  Foundation,  the  Senior  Health  Advisor  of  the  Swiss  Agency  for
Development and Cooperation in Bern, US Federal Drug Administration (FDA), the Head
of Blood and Tissue Pathogens, the Director of Critical Reagents Program and Medical
Countermeasure Systems of the US Department of Defense, Adventitious Agents and
Diagnostics  in  the  Division  of  Virology  of  the  UK  National  Institute  for  Biological
Standards and Control (NIBSC), the Director of the Office of Genomics and Advanced
Technologies of the Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases of the US National
Institutes  of  Health  (NIH)/National  Institutes  of  Allergies  and  Infectious  Diseases
(NIAID)/Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in Bethesda Maryland, the
US  Center  for  Devices  and  Radiological  Health  (CDRH),  the  Chief  of  the  Diagnostic
Systems Division of  the US Army Medical  Research Institute for  Infectious Diseases
(AMRIID), the Team Leader of Molecular and Immunodiagnostics of the National Center
for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases of the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Senior Advisor for Global Affairs of Institut Pasteur in Paris, the
Coordinator of the Arbovirus Unit and Virus Haemorrhagic Fevers Unit of the Institut
Pasteur in Dakar, the Senior Health Specialist of UNICEF, and the Head of Diagnostics
and  Therapeutics  of  the  Public  Health  Agency  of  Canada,  all  met  with  the  WHO
Assistant  Director-General  of  Health  Systems  and  Innovation,  the  WHO  Assistant
Director-General of Polio and Emergencies, the WHO’s Team Leader of the Laboratory
Strengthening and Biorisk Management,  representatives of  the WHO Department of
Essential Medicines and Health Products and of the WHO Global Malaria Programme,
the Programme Manager of the WHO Regional Office for Europe in Copenhagen, the
WHO Director of  Collaborating Centre for Viral  Haemorrhagic Fevers within the US
Centers  for  Disease  Control  and Prevention (CDC),  the  WHO’s  Senior  Manager  with
technical expertise in Diagnostics, among others (WHO, 2014).19 
105 In light of such a cavalry of high profile expertise, the pervasively arbitrary statistics,
the haphazard data collection and inadequate means of diagnosis which were tolerated
throughout  the  2014  global  response  to  ‘Ebola’  in  West  Africa  is  nothing  short  of
astonishing. But such cavalier disregard for scientific rigour in the global health arena
is  not  restricted  to  causal  hypotheses  concerning  African  morbidity  and  mortality.
Consider  the most  recent  ‘outbreak’  of  Zika virus  in  South America  and the global
alarm raised by repetitive association—without isolating and demonstrating any causal
relation—to  microcephaly.  The  Argentinian  medical  group,  Physicians  in  the  Crop-
Sprayed Towns, recently issued a report based on evidence suggesting that pyriproxyfen,
a  larvicide  used  in  Brazil’s  drinking  water  since  2014  to  control  the  Aedes  aegypti
mosquito, could be associated with brain defects that impair foetal brain development
(The New Indian Express, 2016). Similarly, in the absence of any isolation of a virus in
human tissue or blood associated with the symptoms called Ebola in agrarian regions of
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former Zaire, Uganda, and the Congo, why is the impact of environmental toxins such
as prevalent pesticide poisoning always disregarded out of hand?
106 More generally, one has to wonder: what has happened in the global health agenda to
basic rudimentary respect for the rules of scientific warrant, eliminative induction, and
evidence-based medical policy? 
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NOTES
1.  Author’s notes: the opinions in this paper are my own and are not to be considered the official
position of Doctors Without Borders (MSF; Médecins sans Frontières). The author would like to
particularly  thank  Laurent  Ligozat,  Jean  Clement  Cabrol  and  Maude  Montani for  their  vital
contributions.
2.  Epidemic’ refers to an often sudden increase in the number of cases of a disease above what is
normally expected in that population in that area. ‘Outbreak’ is similarly defined, but is often
used for a more limited geographic area.
3.  The  scope  of  GAR’s  work  encompasses  avian  influenza,  cholera,  emerging  diseases  (e.g.
nodding  disease),  Hendra  virus  infection,  influenza  (seasonal  and  pandemic),  leptospirosis,
meningitis,  Nipah virus infection,  plague,  Rift  Valley fever,  SARS and coronavirus infections,
smallpox and human monkeypox, tularaemia, viral haemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Marburg, Lassa,
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, etc.) and yellow fever.
4.  Visceral  leishmaniasis  is  a  parasitic  disease.  If  not treated,  the fatality rate in developing
countries can be as high as 100 per cent within two years. MSF treated 4,611 cases in its facility in
Lankien, South Sudan, in 2014 compared to 1,346 in 2013.
5.  The original IHRs were endorsed in 1969.
6.  See for instance: Hamer (2015); MSF (2006); Rice (2007).
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7.  For example, a new tool for addressing cholera epidemics now exists in the form of an oral
vaccine, but unless an epidemic is declared, there will be no possibility of implementing reactive
vaccination campaigns as part of other measures used to control the outbreak.
8.  Mobile populations in all continents have limited access to health services or choose not to
avail themselves of such services for fear of prosecution. In Indonesia, for example, millions of
‘invisibles’ in Djakarta alone are not registered and therefore not immunised.
9.  See: Radio Dabanga (2014); Boseley (2014).
10.  Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations, both within and outside the UN system,
in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics. They are
designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for
coordination.
11.  ‘Compassionate/emergency  use’  is  the  treatment  of  a  seriously  ill  patient  using  an
unapproved test article where no other available treatments are satisfactory.
12.   Throughout  I  use  square  brackets  to  refer  to  paragraphs  in  Monica Rull’s  and  Ilona
Kickbusch’s contributions to the “Policy Debate |  International responses to global epidemics:
Ebola and beyond” document online URL:  http://poldev.revues.org/2178,  DOI 10.4000/poldev.
2178. This author remains indebted to the Managing Editor Frances Victoria Rice of International
Development Policy, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, for the invitation and generous support in
various capacities to contribute to this forum, to my colleague Prof. Kofi Baku, Dept. of History,
University of Ghana, for suggesting she do so.
13.  David  Kilcullen,  former  US  State  Department’s  Chief  Strategist  in  the  Office  of  the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, says rising tropical sea levels pose a greater threat to civilian
safety in coastal cities than terrorist cells (BBC, 2013).
14.  In 2004 Greater Accra’s rate of mortality for children under five years stood at 75 out of 1,000
children under five years; in the Upper West Region, the rate is 208 for every 1,000 children in
the same age group (Ghana Statistical Service, 2004).
15. For stressing this point I am indebted to Professor Isabella A. Quakyi, of the Department of
Biological, Environmental & Occupational Health Sciences (and foundation Dean) of the School of
Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of Ghana, as well as to Professor Kwadwo
Koram, Director of the Noguchi Memorial  Institute of Medical  Research, Univ.  Ghana. Others
making  the  same  point  include  Prof.  K.  Ampofo,  Head  of  Virology  Dept.  Noguchi  Memorial
Institute for Medical Research, and Dr. J.A.M. Brandful, specialist in mapping HIV genetic strain
developments  and  former  Head  of  Virology,  NMIMR.   Prof.  S.  Chima  MD,  LLM  (head  of  the
Program of Bio & Research Ethics and Medical Law, College of Health Sciences, University of
KwaZulu Natal) concurs that the lack of infrastructure for vaccine research within the continent
is a major shortfall in delivering both long term prophylactic care and reactive treatment for
fatal contagions, participating at the workshop “Giving a Voice to African Thought in Medical
Research Ethics,” organized by Kevin Behrens, director of the Steve Biko Centre of Bioethics and
hosted  at  the  School  of  Clinical  Medicine,  Faculty  of  Health  Sciences,  University  of
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg December 3-5, 2015.
16.  See (The Guardian, 2014). In the last five years the demand for African-trained expertise has
increased. UK’s National Health Service requested in 2014 special concessions of the UK Home
Office for leniency toward immigration applicants seeking employment in the health sector.
17.  I am grateful to Dr. David Rasnick, biochemist, pharmaceutical bio-technologist specialising
in protease inhibitors and cancer researcher, for his evaluation and provision of his annotated
copies of these published studies (Crowe, D. and E. Ely, 2015).
18.  The symptoms of Mingococcal Septicemia, also called Waterhouse-Frederichsen syndrome,
include vomiting, diarrhoea, extensive purpura, cyanosis, tonic-clonic convulsions, circulatory
collapse, usually with haemorrhage into the adrenal glands (Investment Watch, 2014).
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19.  See WHO (2014) for the full  list  of participants of Diagnostics and Ebola Control:  A Joint
WHO/FIND meeting, 12 December 2014, Geneva, Switzerland.
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